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Abstract: Blockchains have a storage scalability issue. Their size is not bounded and they grow
indefinitely as time passes. As of August 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain is about 120GiB big while it
was only 75GiB in August 2016. To benefit from Bitcoin full security model, a bootstrapping node
has to download and verify the entirety of the 120GiB. This poses a challenge for low-resource
devices such as smartphones. Thankfully, an alternative exists for such devices which consists of
downloading and verifying just the header of each block. This partial block verification enables
devices to reduce their bandwidth requirements from 120GiB to 35MiB.
However, this drastic decrease comes with a safety cost implied by a partial block verification. In
this work, we enable low-resource devices to fully verify subchains of blocks without having to pay
the onerous price of a full chain download and verification; a few additional MiB of bandwidth
suffice. To do so, we propose the design of diet nodes that can securely query full nodes for shards
of the UTXO set, which is needed to perform full block verification and can otherwise only be built
by sequentially parsing the chain.
Key-words: blockchain, sharding, UTXO, distributed ledger, cryptocurrency, mobile computing
∗ Univ Rennes, Inria, CNRS, IRISA, France
† Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
‡ Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
Dietcoin: court-circuiter la vérification dans Bitcoin pour
les téléphones mobiles
Résumé :
Les blockchains telles que Bitcoin passent mal à l’échelle, notamment du fait de leurs besoins
important de stockage. Les besoins de stockage d’une blockchain typique ne sont pas limités
et croissent indéfiniment. Par exemple, en août 2017, les données contenues dans la blockchain
Bitcoin représentaient environ 120 GiB, contre 75GiB un an auparavant, en août 2016. Pour
bénéficier des garanties complètes de sécurité apportées par Bitcoin, un nœud qui rejoint le réseau
doit télécharger et vérifier l’intégralité des 120 GiB de données. Cette nécessité pose un défi pour
les appareils à faibles ressources tels que les smartphones. Heureusement, une alternative existe
pour de tels dispositifs qui consiste à télécharger et à vérifier seulement l’en-tête de chaque bloc
de la blockchain. Cette vérification partielle des blocs permet aux appareils de réduire leurs
besoins en bande passante de 120 GiB à 35 MiB, mais cette diminution drastique ne permet
qu’une vérification partielle des blocs, et diminue grandement les garanties de sécurité offertes
aux nœuds qui l’utilisent.
Dans ce travail, nous proposons une approche qui permet aux appareils à faibles ressources de
vérifier entièrement des sous-chaînes de blocs sans avoir à payer le prix onéreux d’un télécharge-
ment et d’une vérification complète de la chaîne ; quelques MiB supplémentaires de bande pas-
sante suffisent. Pour ce faire, nous proposons d’introduire des nœuds Dietcoin qui sont capables
en toute sécurité d’interroger des nœuds exécutant le protocole complet pour obtenir des frag-
ments d’un ensemble appelé UTXO, nécessaire à la vérification complète des blocs.
Mots-clés : blockchain, partitionnement, UTXO, registre distribué, monnaie cryptographique,
informatique mobile
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1 Trustless Bitcoin
Within a decade, blockchains have become extremely popular, and have been used to implement
several widely-used crytocurrencies [1], and smart-contract services [2]. A blockchain implements
a tamper-proof distributed ledger in which public transactions can be recorded in a close-to-
irrevocable manner. Recorded transactions are stored into blocks, which are then incrementally
linked (or chained) in order to form an append-only list. The irrevocability of these chaining
mechanisms exploits cryptographic mechanisms and peer-to-peer exchanges. This combination
makes it in principle inconceivably hard for individual participants to revoke past transactions
(due to the computational cost involved), while it remains possible for any participant to verify
the validity of a blockchain’s entire history.
Verifying a blockchain remains, however, a particularly costly process. The verifying node
must first download the entire blockchain, which in many cases has reached a size beyond the
communication capabilities of many mobile devices. The Bitcoin blockchain, for instance, had
grown to 120GiB as of August 2017 (Figure 1), and follows an exponential growth, implying the
problem can only become more acute.
Once the blockchain has been downloaded, the verifying node must then check its consistency
block by block, a lengthy process that can take hours on high-end machines. The exorbitant
price of a full chain verification makes it unrealistic for low-resource devices to fully implement
a blockchain protocol. Some blockchain systems, such as Bitcoin, therefore enable nodes to
perform varying degrees of verification: full nodes verify everything while lightweight nodes only
verify a small fraction of the data.
In the case of Bitcoin, this lightweight verification is known as Simplified Payment Verifica-
tion (SPV for short). SPV nodes only download and verify a much reduced version of the Bitcoin
blockchain, comprised only of its block headers, which today only weights 35MiB (a reduction
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Figure 1: Both the Bitcoin blockchain and the UTXO set have almost tripled in size in the past
two years.
by three orders of magnitude). This summary version however only contains the chaining infor-
mation making up the blockchain, not the recorded transactions. This information is sufficient
for SPV nodes to verify that the chain’s structure is valid (and hence very unlikely to have been
created by malicious nodes), but not that a past transaction does exist in the chain. As a result,
SPV nodes are vulnerable to attacks in which an attacker leads an SPV node to believe a trans-
action t has occurred, while t is later on rejected by the system because the funds transferred by
t have in fact already been spent (known as a double-spend attack).
To protect themselves against double-spend attacks, full nodes keep track of unspent funds
in a structure known as the set of Unspent TransaCTion Outputs (UTXO set). The UTXO
set is unfortunately costly to construct (as this construction requires the entire blockchain), to
exchange (currently weighing 1.9GiB, see Figure 1), and to maintain, which explains why SPV
nodes do not use it.
In this report, we propose to bridge the gap between full nodes and SPV nodes by introducing
diet nodes, and their associated protocol, Dietcoin. Dietcoin strengthens the security guarantees
of SPV nodes by bringing them close to those of full nodes. Dietcoin enables low-resource nodes
to verify the transactions contained in a block without constructing a full-fledged UTXO set. In
our protocol, diet nodes download from full nodes only the parts of the UTXO set they need
in order to verify a transaction of interest. This selective download mechanism must, however,
be realized with care. Diet nodes must be able to detect any tampering of the UTXO set itself,
at a cost that remains affordable for low-resource devices, both in terms of communication and
computing overhead.
The rest of this report is structured as follows. We first present the Bitcoin protocol in more
detail (Section 2), and explain the workings of full and SPV nodes. We then detail the design
of Dietcoin and diet nodes and discuss the security guarantees they provide (Section 3). Finally,
we present related work (Section 4), and conclude (Section 5).
2 The Bitcoin system
A blockchain is a decentralized ledger composed of blocks containing transactions. The transac-
tions, the blocks, and the resulting chain obey a few core rules that ensure the system remains
tamper-proof. Great care is required when modifying these rules, as even minor changes might
break the blockchain’s properties and its security guarantees.
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Figure 2: A blockchain is formed of a sequence of blocks containing transactions. The current
state of the blockchain (here (B0, B1, B2)) is stored by each individual miner.
In the following, we first detail the default workings of the Bitcoin blockchain and its ra-
tionale1. We then build upon these explanations to introduce and justify the changes we are
proposing.
2.1 Overview
In a blockchain system such as Bitcoin, the blockchain proper ((Bk)k∈Z≥0 , label 1 in Figure 2) is
maintained by a peer-to-peer network of miners. Each block Bk links to the previous block Bk−1
by including in its header a cryptographic hash that is (i) easy to verify, but (ii) particularly costly
to create (this second point is one of the central element of blockchains with open membership,
which we will discuss in detail just below). The leftmost block B0 is known as the Genesis Block :
it is the first and oldest block in the blockchain, and it is the only block with no predecessor.
2.1.1 Recording a new transaction
To transfer 8 bitcoins from herself to Bob, the user Alice must first create a valid transaction (la-
bel 2 ) that contains information proving she actually owns the 8 bitcoins (with a cryptographic
signature using asymmetric keys), and encode the resulting transaction output with Bob’s pub-
lic key (such that, in turn, only Bob will be able to demonstrate ownership of the transaction’s
output).
Alice then broadcasts this new transaction to the network of miners 3 , in order for it to be
included in the blockchain. Before adding Alice’s transaction into the blockchain, Miner A first
verifies that the transaction is valid (label 4 in Figure 3, details on the transaction verification
process will follow in Section 2.2.1-(BV2)).
Miner A then includes Alice’s transaction together with other transactions received in parallel
into a new block (B3, 5 ), and attempts to link it to the current tip of the blockchain. This linkage
operation requires Miner A to solve a probabilistically difficult cryptopuzzle 6 that regulates
the frequency at which blocks are created (or mined) by the whole network. (In Bitcoin, this
periodicity is set to one block every 10 minutes.) If Miner A succeeds, the new block B3 is now
1Blockchains with closed membership or different consensus protocols are not discussed in this section
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Figure 3: To add a new transaction to the current blockchain, a miner first verifies the validity
of the transaction. It must then solve a costly cryptopuzzle to encapsulate this transaction in a
new block (here B3), before disseminating this block to other miners.
linked to the existing block chain (B0, B1, B2), and is disseminated to the other miners 7 . When
a miner receives a new block (here Miner B), it checks that the transactions included are valid,
along with the cryptopuzzle 8 , before including the new block in its local copy of the blockchain.
The new block ultimately reaches Bob 9 , who can check that the transaction has been properly
recorded (and can then, for example, sell some goods to Alice).
2.1.2 Irrevocability of deep blocks
Because blocks are produced at a limited rate such that all the miners receive block Bk before
they can successfully mine a concurrent block Bk′ , honest miners are highly likely to extend the
chain when producing a new block, ensuring a consistent system state with high probability. The
views of individual miners may however diverge in problematic cases, causing branches to appear.
When a branch occurs, miners resolve the divergence by choosing as valid branch the one that
was the most difficult to create (details on block difficulty will follow in Section 2.2.1-(BV2)).
Blocks that are left out of the chain are said to be orphan.
The risk of being made orphan decreases exponentially as a block lies deeper in a chain,
ensuring the practical irrevocability of deep blocks and the transactions they contain. This
is illustrated in Figure 4: consider an attacker who wishes to revoke a block Bn−k (targeted
block), that lies k blocks away from the chain’s tip Bn. For this attack to succeed, this attacker
must produce an alternative subchain (B′n−k, .., B
′
n, B
′
n+1) that is more difficult to create than
the current chain. Producing this subchain is however extremely costly, and takes time which
increases the odds that the legitimate chain grows (with a block Bn+1, thus requesting an even
more difficult attack subchain) before the attacker succeeds. When the computing power of the
attacker is less than half of that of the rest of the network, his probability of success drops
exponentially with k.
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Figure 4: Revoking the content of a block Bn−k deep in the chain requires constructing a better
alternative subchain, which becomes exponentially harder as the block lies deeper.
2.2 Transactions, Blocks, and UTXO set
To benefit from the full security of Bitcoin, Bob should verify the validity of the new block that
contains Alice’s payment to him (label 9 in Figure 3) in addition to verifying the validity of
Alice’s transaction. This is because Alice could collude with a miner (or launch herself a miner),
and produce an invalid block that she would advertise to Bob. Bitcoin relies on a number of built-
in validity checks on blocks and transactions to conduct this verification. However, whereas full
nodes exploit all of these checks, Simple Payment Verification nodes (SPV nodes) only perform
a limited verification. In the following, we describe the details of these validity checks, we discuss
the role of an intermediary set known as the set of Unspent TransaCTion Outputs (UTXO set),
and the shortcomings of SPV nodes ensued by the limited verification they perform.
2.2.1 Checking block validity
A block is valid if and only if it meets the following two conditions.
• (BV1) Its header respects the blockchain’s Proof-of-Work predicate.
• (BV2) It only contains valid transactions (which we discuss further below).
BV1: The Proof-of-Work predicate makes it very difficult for malicious actors to alter the
blockchain in an attempt to edit the ledger. The Proof-of-Work predicate is used as a lock-in
mechanism to anchor blocks in the chain. It is enforced on each block header, whose simplified
structure is shown in Figure 5. The header of each block Bk points both to the header of the
previous block Bk−1 (using a hash function, 1 ), and to the transactions contained in the current
block Bk 2 . To fulfill the Proof-of-Work predicate 4 , a header must contain a nonce 3 such
that the hash of the header is less than a difficulty target. The difficulty target is set so that a new
block is created every ten minutes by the miners as a whole, regardless of the computation power
(the difficulty target is regularly adjusted to cope with changes in their computation power).
Finding a nonce respecting the difficulty target is computationally very expensive, as every
miner competes to create blocks. This computing cost prevents attackers from easily tampering
the chain as they have to recompute fresh nonces for the blocks they wish to replace.
To establish a secure and verifiable link between the header of Bk and the corresponding
block Bk, the pointer to Bk’s transactions 2 consists of the root of a Merkle tree. A Merkle tree
is a hierarchical hashing mechanism for sets that enables a verifier to efficiently test whether an
item (here a transaction) belongs to the set by reconstructing the root of the Merkle tree. Each
leaf node in a Merkle tree consists of the hash of an item, while each internal node (including
RR n° 9162
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Figure 5: Content of a block header (simplified).
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Figure 6: Example of a Merkle tree root reconstruction that only needs log(n) hashes.
the root) consists of the hash of its children. This makes it possible to reconstruct the root, and
thus verify set membership, using only a logarithmic number of intermediate hashes. In Figure 6
for example, a node can verify the presence of transaction A in the set by (i) downloading the
root from a secured communication channel (e.g., the blockchain), and (ii) downloading A and
the three intermediate hashes shown in red: HB , HCD and HEFGH , and reconstructing the root
from the downloaded hashes. The reconstructed root should match the downloaded one.
BV2: In addition to the Proof-of-Work predicate (BV1), all the transactions included in a block
must also be valid for the overall block to be valid. Figure 7 shows the validity mechanisms
included in a typical Bitcoin transaction. In this example, Alice uses 3 coins she owns (the
transaction’s inputs 1 ) to pay 7 Bitcoins to Bob, and 4 to Tux (the transaction’s outputs 2 ).
Only coins created in earlier transactions may be spent: each of Alice’s inputs therefore points
back to the output of an earlier transaction 3 . To ensure that only the recipients (Bob and Tux)
are able to spend the output, each new coin contains an ownership challenge (a hashed public
key), that must be solved to spend this coin 4 .
Alice’s transaction is only valid if the following three conditions are met:
• (TV1) The inputs do exist, and Alice owns them. She can prove her ownership of the
inputs by providing a public key matching their ownership challenges 5 , and by signing
the new transaction with the corresponding private key2 6 ;
• (TV2) No money is created in the transaction. In effect, the total value of the transaction’s
2Bitcoin uses a scripting language to encode challenges and proofs of ownership, enabling for more complex
schemes, but for ease of exposition we limit ourselves to the typical case.
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Figure 7: Structure of a transaction.
inputs must be greater than or equal to that of its outputs:∑
in∈inputs(t)
value(in) ≥
∑
out∈outputs(t)
value(out).
The difference
∑
value(in) − ∑ value(out) is given as a fee to the miner of the block
containing the transaction;
• (TV3) The transaction’s inputs (tx_IDi, indexj) have not been spent yet (i.e., they do not
appear as inputs of any earlier transaction, an attack known as a double spend).
2.2.2 The set of Unspent TransaCTion Outputs (UTXO set)
While the validity of a block’s header (BV1) only requires access to the current block Bk, and to
the header of its predecessor Bk−1, verifying transactions (BV2) requires a lot more information.
Verifying the ownership challenges of input coins (TV1), and their amount (TV2) requires access
to the transactions recorded in earlier blocks. Worse, verifying that inputs coins have not yet
been spent (TV3) potentially requires parsing and verifying the entire blockchain.
To avoid performing such a costly operation for each new block, nodes that verify transactions
maintain an intermediary set known as the set of Unspent TransaCTion Outputs (UTXO set).
The UTXO set contains all the coins that have been created in the chain but not spent in later
transactions, it thus contains all the spendable coins.
A node verifying transactions can prevent double spends (TV3) by simply ensuring that all
the inputs of a transaction appears in its UTXO set. The UTXO set evolves as new correct blocks
are added to the chain: transaction outputs are removed from the set when they are spent, and
outputs of new transaction are added to the set.
2.3 The limitations of SPV nodes
In spite of its benefits, constructing a local UTXO set is costly: in order to obtain the set, a
node must first download the entire chain (120 GiB as of August 2017, see Figure 1 and validate
it (a lengthy process that can take hours on high-end machines), even if only the latest block is
relevant to its interest.
RR n° 9162
10 Frey & Makkes & Roman & Taïani & Voulgaris
Because of this cost, Bitcoin supports several levels of verification. Miners and users run-
ning full nodes construct the UTXO set and check both block headers (BV1) and transactions
(TV1,2,3 and as a result BV2). By performing all the possible checks, full nodes benefit from
the maximum security that the Bitcoin system has to offer.
By contrast, Simple Payment Verification nodes (SPV nodes) do not construct the UTXO
set. Instead, they only download the chain’s block headers (rather than full blocks), and verify
that these headers are valid (BV1). With the headers only, SPV nodes are able to verify the
well-formedness of the blockchain including the crucial Proof-of-Work predicate that seals the
links of the chain.
However, because this verification is only partial, SPV nodes are unable to detect if a new
block contains an invalid transaction. This scenario, however probabilistically difficult to accom-
plish for an attacker, is a vulnerability of SPV nodes. To circumvent this vulnerability, SPV
nodes typically wait until miners have created subsequent blocks extending the chain containing
a block of interest, which implies that these miners have performed a full verification on it and
consider this block as valid.
The need for SPV nodes to wait makes it particularly problematic to use Bitcoin on limited
devices (i.e. mobile phones) for everyday transactions. SPV nodes are not even able to check
whether the inputs used in a transaction do exist. It also limits the ability of SPV nodes to
detect faulty transactions as early as possible, which is an important usability feature of modern
payment systems.
In this work, we propose to overcome the inherent limitations of SPV nodes with Dietcoin.
Dietcoin enables nodes with limited resources (diet nodes) to benefit from a security level that
is close to that of full nodes, at a fraction of the cost required to run full security checks.
3 The Dietcoin system
To address the vulnerabilities of SPV nodes and to improve the confidence mobile users can have
in recent transactions, we propose Dietcoin, an extension to Bitcoin-like blockchains. Although
our proposal can be applied to most existing Proof-of-Work blockchains using the UTXO model
for coins, we describe Dietcoin in the context of the Bitcoin system as presented in Section 2.
The core of Dietcoin consists of a novel class of nodes, called diet nodes, which provide low-
power devices with the ability to perform full block verification with minimal bandwidth and
storage requirements. Instead of having to download and process the entire blockchain to build
their own copy of the UTXO set, diet nodes query the UTXO set of full nodes and use it to verify
the legitimacy of the transactions they are interested in (as described in Section 2.2.1-(BV2))
and the correctness of the blocks that contain them. This gives diet nodes security properties
that sit in between those of full nodes, and those of Bitcoin’s SPV nodes.
Consider a user wishing to verify a transaction for the sale of some goods. The user’s diet
node will initially proceed like a standard SPV node. It will contact a full node to obtain the
header of the block that supposedly contains its transaction as well as the corresponding branch
of the transaction Merkle tree, to verify that the transaction indeed is included in the block.
But while an SPV node would stop at this inclusion check, the diet node continues by verifying
both the inclusion and the correctness of all the transactions in the block. To make this possible
we introduce the possibility for diet nodes to access the state of the UTXO set of full nodes
corresponding to the instant right before the block they want to verify.
Since downloading the entire UTXO set would result in prohibitive bandwidth overhead, as
shown in Figure 1, Dietcoin-enabled full nodes split their UTXO set into small shards, enabling
diet nodes to download only the shards that are relevant to the transactions in the block.
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To prevent diet nodes from trusting maliciously forged shards, the shard hashes are used as
leaves of a Merkle tree, which root is stored in each block. Having the Merkle root stored in blocks
enables the UTXO shards to benefit from the same Proof-of-Work protection as transactions.
In addition to the full verification done on the block of their interest Bk, diet nodes can
increase their trust in Bk by fully verifying its previous blocks. By doing so, diet nodes are
ensured that none of the l verified blocks contain illegal transactions nor erroneous UTXO Merkle
root. To make a diet node trust a forged transaction in block Bk, an attacker has to counterfeit
the subchain of l + 1 blocks (Bk−l, ..., Bk). Thanks to the Proof-of-Work protection, the cost of
this attack increases exponentially as l increases linearly.
In the following, we detail the operation of Dietcoin by first describing how full nodes can
provide diet nodes with verifiable UTXO shards. Secondly we discuss how miners link blocks to
the state of their UTXO set. We then explain how diet nodes can extend the verification process
from one block to a subchain of any length. Finally, we detail the operation of diet nodes when
verifying transactions.
3.1 Sharding the UTXO set
To enable the operation of diet nodes, Dietcoin-enabled full nodes need (i) to provide diet nodes
with shards of the UTXO set, while (ii) enabling them to verify that these shards are authentic.
To satisfy (i), Dietcoin-enabled full nodes store the UTXO set resulting from the application
of the transactions in each block in the form of shards with a predefined maximum size of 1KiB
(on average, across all shards). The use of shards enables diet nodes to download only the
relevant parts of the UTXO set and also limits the storage requirements at full nodes, which
only need to store the modified shards for each block to let diet nodes query older versions of the
shards. Similarly, the limit of 1KiB for the size of each shard limits the bandwidth employed by
diet nodes in the verification process.
To satisfy (ii), full nodes also maintain a Merkle tree that indexes all the shards of the UTXO
set. Using shards also proves advantageous with respect to this Merkle tree. If nodes were to
index UTXO entries directly, the continuous changes in the UTXO set would cause the Merkle
tree to become quickly unbalanced, leading to performance problems or requiring a potentially
costly self-balancing tree. The use of shards, combined with the right sharding strategy, gives
the UTXO Merkle tree a relatively constant structure, enabling shards to be updated in place
most of the time. Moreover, it makes it possible to predict the size of the UTXO Merkle tree
and its incurred overhead, which enables us to better control and balance the storage overhead
for full nodes and the bandwidth requirements of diet nodes.
A number of sharding strategies satisfy the requirement of a fixed number of shards. In this
work, we use the simplest approach consisting of indexing UTXO entries by their first k bits.
This strategy resembles a random approach since the first bits of an UTXO are the transaction
hash it references, which value is expected to be random due to the uniformity property of the
SHA-256 hash function. This strategy comes with the added advantages of obtaining shards of
homogeneous size and a full binary Merkle tree with 2k leaves.
Keeping in mind the size cap of 1KiB per shard, k can be adapted locally by each node to
cope with the growth of the UTXO set. When the average shard size breaches the cap of 1KiB,
k is incremented by one resulting in (i) halving the average shard size, and (ii) adding one layer
to the Merkle tree, doubling its storage footprint in the process.
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Figure 8: The UTXO set is updated every time a block is validated. For a counterfeited block
to be validated by diet nodes, a malicious node has to forge at least two consecutive blocks: the
first block Bk−1 containing a fake Merkle root of UTXOk−1, and the second block Bk spending
fake coins validated by the fake UTXOk−1.
3.2 Linking blocks with the UTXO set
With reference to Figure 8, consider a Dietcoin-enabled miner that is mining block Bk, and let
UTXOk be the state of the UTXO set after applying all the transactions in Bk. The miner
stores the root of the UTXO Merkle tree associated with UTXOk as an unspendable output in
the first transaction of block Bk before trying to solve the Proof-of-Work as shown in Figure 8.
Storing the root of the UTXO Merkle tree in the first transaction of the block does not require
any modification to the structure of Bitcoin’s blocks. Thus it is possible for Dietcoin-enabled
full nodes and miners to co-exist with their legacy Bitcoin counterparts.
Dietcoin-enabled full nodes verify the value of the UTXO Merkle root against their own local
copy when they verify a block, while legacy Bitcoin nodes simply ignore it.
The UTXO Merkle tree provides a computationally efficient way for diet nodes to verify
whether the shards they download during the verification process are legitimate and correspond
to the current state of the ledger. Still referring to Figure 8, let us consider a diet node d that
wishes to verify a transaction in block Bk. Node d needs to obtain: block Bk, the UTXO Merkle
root in block Bk−1, the shards of the UTXO set between the two blocks, and the elements of the
associated Merkle tree that are required to verify their legitimacy. It can then verify the shards
using the root stored in block Bk−1’s first transaction, and use them to verify the correctness of
the transactions in Bk.
We observe that storing the Merkle-root referring to the state after the block into the block
itself forces diet nodes to download two blocks to verify transactions. This makes it inherently
harder for an attacker to provide a diet node with a fake block Bk because it would need to forge
not only block Bk but also block Bk−1.
3.3 Extended verification
Diet nodes have the ability to extend their confidence in a block by iterating the verification
process towards its previous blocks. By doing so, diet nodes ensure the correctness of the UTXO
Merkle root present in block Bk−1 used to verify the correctness of block Bk. The extended
verification can be performed on a subchain of any length l provided that the verifying diet node
can query UTXO shards of any age. A diet node fully verifying the subchain (Bk−l+1, ..., Bk)
can only be tricked into trusting a malicious transaction in block Bk if the attacker manages
to counterfeit the l+ 1 successive blocks starting from Bk−l, which becomes exponentially more
costly as l increases linearly.
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The block Bk−l contains the UTXO Merkle root that serves as a basis for the verification of
the consequent blocks. Since the block Bk−l is not verified, it is thus trusted by the diet node.
A comparison can be made with full nodes where the first block of the chain, the genesis block,
is hard-coded and is therefore trusted. By shifting the trust from the genesis block to the block
Bk−l for diet nodes, Dietcoin effectively shortcuts the verification process.
Picking the value of l exhibits a trade-off between security and verification costs. On one
hand choosing a great l draws the behavior of the diet node closer to that of a full node, while on
the other hand choosing a small l draws it closer to that of an SPV node. The user can make her
decision based on which block depth l is great enough in her opinion such that all blocks prior
to Bk−l are unlikely to be counterfeited. For instance, a diet node user can choose l such that
the trusted block has a block depth of 6 or greater since it is the de facto standard in Bitcoin to
consider blocks of depth 6 or greater as secured3.
In the case depicted in Figure 8, assuming l = 2, diet node d downloads block Bk−1 to verify
the transactions and the UTXO Merkle root in Bk−1 to further increase its confidence in Bk. To
verify Bk−1, the diet node uses the UTXO Merkle root in Bk−2.
3.4 Detailed Operation
Equipped with the knowledge of Dietcoin’s basic mechanisms, we can now detail the verification
process carried out by diet nodes. Algorithm 1 depicts the actions taken by a diet node when
its user starts the application using Dietcoin and compares it with those taken by legacy SPV
clients. Black dotted lines [•] are specific to diet nodes, while hollow dotted lines [◦] are common
to both diet and SPV nodes.
The algorithm begins when the application using Dietcoin starts and updates its view of
the blockchain. In this first part of the algorithm, a diet node behaves exactly in the same
manner as an SPV node. First, it issues a query containing the latest known block hash and an
obfuscated representation of its own public keys in the form of a bloom filter (lines 4-5). A full
node responds to this query by sending a list of all the block headers that are still unknown to
the SPV/diet node, together with the transactions matching the SPV/diet node’s bloom filter,
and the information from the transaction Merkle tree that is needed to confirm their presence in
their blocks. Using this information, the SPV/diet node verifies the received headers (including
Proof-of-Work verification) and updates its view of the blockchain (line 6).
Since the response from the full node might contain false positives due to the use of a bloom
filter for public key obfuscation, the next verification step consists in ensuring that the received
transactions match one of the user’s public keys (lines 8-9). Once false positives are discarded,
the SPV/diet node verifies that the received transactions are in the blocks (line 10-12).
At this point, a standard SPV node simply returns the received transactions to the application
(line 14). A diet node, on the other hand, continues the verification process. To this end, the
diet node first computes which blocks to fully verify to ensure that (i) no block is fully verified
twice (line 17), (ii) old blocks considered by the user as secured enough are not fully verified
(parameter maxDepthp, line 17) and (iii) only a subchain of limited length l is fully verified
(parameter maxLengthp, line 19). If no block is selected for full verification, the diet node falls
back to SPV mode (lines 20-21).
To bootstrap the full verification process, the diet node must first download the UTXOMerkle
root present in the block prior to the first block to verify (line 23). For each of the selected blocks
Bk, the diet node downloads from Dietcoin-enabled full nodes (i) the block Bk itself (line 25), (ii)
the state, before Bk, of the UTXO shards associated with both the block’s transactions’ inputs
3https://bitcoin.org/en/developer-guide#verifying-payment
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and outputs (line 26), and (iii) the partial UTXO Merkle tree required to prove the integrity of
the downloaded shards (line 26).
Once it has all the data, the diet node proceeds with the verification process. For each block
Bk, it first verifies that the downloaded UTXO shards match the UTXO Merkle root from the
previous block Bk−1 (lines 27-29). Then it verifies that the transactions in each block use only
available inputs from these shards (lines 32-33), and computes the new state of these shards based
on the transactions in Bk (lines 34, 36). Finally it verifies that the updated shards lead to the
UTXO Merkle root contained in Bk (lines 37-39). Once the verification process has terminated,
the diet node returns the transactions associated with the local user to the application (line 14).
4 Related work
Making the UTXO set available for queries between nodes has been discussed several times in
the Bitcoin community over the past few years. Bryan Bishop published a comprehensive list
of such proposals [3] that share some of the following goals: (i) enabling faster node bootstrap,
(ii) strengthening the security guarantees of lightweight nodes, and (iii) scaling the UTXO
set to reduce its storage cost. The primary goal of Dietcoin is to strengthen the security of
lightweight nodes. Dietcoin’s strongest feature is the ability for diet nodes to efficiently perform
subchain verification, as described in Section 3.3, which offers stronger security guarantees than
the referenced proposals made by the community. Moreover, even though we focus in this report
on the security of lightweight nodes, it is also possible to bootstrap full nodes faster with Dietcoin.
Sharing similar goals with Dietcoin, Andrew Miller [4] suggests to store in blocks the root
of a self-balancing Merkle tree built on top of the UTXO set. In such a system, lightweight
nodes only download the UTXOs they need, which results in a lower bandwidth consumption
than with shards as we propose it, but at the cost of a greater storage overhead since the stored
Merkle tree is larger. Moreover, Dietcoin combines a full, and thus always balanced, Merkle tree
built on top of 2k shards that can each be updated in place as blocks are appended to the chain.
This combination of tree stability and updatable shards enables efficient subchain verification,
as described in Section 3.3, and adapting this feature to a system using a self-balancing Merkle
tree does not seem trivial.
Vault [5] also proposes to use Merkle trees to securely record the state of the distributed
ledger in recent blocks, and shards this state across nodes, to reduce storage costs. Contrarily
to Dietcoin, however, Vault targets balance-based schemes, such as introduced by Ethereum, in
blockchains relying on Proof-of-Stake consensus. Vault further stores individual accounts in the
Merkle trees, rather than UTXO shards as we do. This represents a different and to some extent
orthogonal trade-off to that of Dietcoin, in that Vault chooses to increase the size of Merkle tree
witnesses that must be included in transactions, but removes the need for lightweight nodes to
download UTXO shards.
Whereas we focus on sharding the resulting state of the blockchain, other systems propose to
shard the verification process. Both Elastico [6] and OmniLedger [7] proposes a permissionless
distributed ledger using multiple classical PBFT consensus protocols each executing within a
subset (shard) of nodes.
Elastico limits the number of shards a malicious nodes may join (under different identifies)
by tying the shard of a node to the result of a Proof-of-Work puzzle. OmniLedger [7] extends the
ideas proposed by Elastico [6] to increase the size of the shards (and thus reduce the probability
of failures), and allow for cross-shards transactions thanks to a Byzantine shard-atomic commit
protocol called Atomix. Both Elastico and OmniLedger use sharding to increase the transaction
processing power of a distributed ledger, rather than to improve access and verification of the
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UTXO set, as we do.
Chainiac [8] combines the ideas of skiplists and blockchains to realize skipchains, an authen-
ticated log with both back and forward long-distance links to implement a distributed authen-
ticated software-release ledger. Chainiac relies on digital collective signatures to implement for-
ward links, which are not available in permissionless Proof-of-Work chains such as Bitcoin. Long
distance links are particularly well adapted to navigate a well-identified subset of a blockchain
(such as a package’s releases). They were not however directly designed to handle the kind of
dependencies captured by the UTXO model.
An entirely different approach to scaling blockchains for lightweight nodes is the use of Non-
Interactive Proofs of Proof-of-Work (NIPoPoWs) [9] that enable constant size queries. NIPoPoWs
strive for minimal cost of proof of inclusion of a transaction in a chain, thus reducing to a
minimum the bandwidth requirements of lightweight nodes. NIPoPoWs however do not aim at
offering improved security for lightweight nodes as we do with Dietcoin.
5 Conclusion
In this report, we have presented the design of Dietcoin, that proposes a new form of Bitcoin
nodes that strengthens the security guarantees of lightweight SPV nodes by bringing them closer
to those of full Bitcoin nodes. The Dietcoin protocol enables low-resource nodes to verify the
transactions contained in blocks without constructing a full-fledged UTXO set. In our protocol,
diet nodes download from full nodes parts of the UTXO set they need in order to verify a block,
or a subchain of blocks, of interest. Diet nodes are able to detect any tampering of the UTXO set
itself, at a cost that remains affordable for low-resource devices, both in terms of communication
and computing overhead. In our approach, Dietcoin-enabled full nodes split their UTXO set
into small shards, and enable diet nodes to download only the shards that are relevant to the
transactions in the block, while verifying that these shards do indeed corresponds to the state of
the UTXO set for the block they are verifying.
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bloomFilter(keys) Compute a bloom filter from keys
buildMRoot(hashes) Compute the Merkle root from hashes
getShardKey(txId) Apply the sharding algorithm to txId
height(header) Index of header starting from the genesis block
updateMTreeInPlace(MTree, dataset) Update the hashes of MTree with the new value of dataset
verifyHeaders(headers) Add headers to the chain, return the hash of the new chain tip
Algorithm 1 – SPV [◦] and Diet [◦•] node p (compacted)
1: parameters: ◦ pubKeysp, • maxDepthp, • maxLengthp
2: global variables: ◦ headerStorep, ◦ tipIdp, • highestVerifiedp
◦3: procedure updateChain( ) . App interface
◦4: filter← bloomFilter(pubKeysp)
◦5: ({header, txMTree, txs})← send queryMerkleBlocks(tipIdp, filter)
◦6: tipIdp ← verifyHeaders((header))
◦7: for all {header, txMTree, txs} ∈ ({header, txMTree, txs}) do
◦8: if ∀k ∈ pubKeysp : k /∈ {tx.inputs ∪ tx.outputs} then
◦9: continue . Ignore bloom filter false positives
◦10: assert(∀tx ∈ txs : HASH(tx) ∈ txMTree)
◦11: builtTxMRoot← buildMRoot(txMTree)
◦12: assert(builtTxMRoot = header.txMRoot)
•13: verifyBlocksUpTo(height(header))
◦14: callback(txs, header) . Callback to app
•15: procedure verifyBlocksUpTo(last)
•16: . Do not verify blocks twice or below maxDepthp
•17: first←max(highestVerifiedp, height(tipIdp)−maxDepthp)
•18: . Verify up to maxLengthp blocks
•19: first←max(first, last−maxLengthp)
•20: if first ≥ last then
•21: return . Fallback to SPV mode
•22: . The first UTXO Merkle root is not verified
•23: utxoMRoot← send queryUtxoMRoot(HASH(headerStorep[first]))
•24: for all blockId of height ∈ [first + 1, last] do
•25: block← send queryBlock(blockId)
•26: {shards, utxoMTree} ← send queryUtxos(blockId)
•27: assert(∀shard ∈ shards : HASH(shard) ∈ utxoMTree)
•28: builtUtxoMRoot← buildMRoot(utxoMTree)
•29: assert(builtUtxoMRoot = utxoMRoot)
•30: for all tx ∈ block.transactions do
•31: for all i ∈ tx.inputs do
•32: shard← shards[getShardKey(i)]
•33: assert(i ∈ shard ∧ valid proof of ownership of i)
•34: shard.remove(i)
•35: for all o ∈ tx.outputs do
•36: shards[getShardKey(o)].add(o)
•37: utxoMTree← updateMTreeInPlace(utxoMTree, shards)
•38: utxoMRoot← buildMRoot(utxoMTree)
•39: assert(utxoMRoot = block.utxoMRoot)
•40: highestVerifiedp ← height(blockId)
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